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Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey: The Ninth Circuit’s
Expansion of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration
Hearings Contradicts the Supreme Court’s LopezMendoza Decision
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,1 the Ninth Circuit faced the issue
of whether statements by Lopez-Rodriguez, given to immigration
officials after they entered Lopez-Rodriguez’s residence without an
invitation or warrant, should be suppressed in a civil immigration
hearing.2 The court applied a reasonableness standard to the officers’
actions and held that the evidence should be suppressed because the
entry was an unreasonable violation of Lopez-Rodriguez’s Fourth
Amendment rights.3
The Ninth Circuit, however, wrongly decided Lopez-Rodriguez
because the court applied a reasonableness standard that is an overly
broad interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.4 The
reasonableness standard is the established rule in the Ninth Circuit
for the suppression of evidence in civil immigration cases.5 This rule
has been extrapolated from dicta in the Supreme Court’s 1984
Lopez-Mendoza decision, which created the bright-line rule that the
exclusionary rule, which suppressing evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, is not applicable in immigration
hearings.6 However, in dicta supported by four Justices, a plurality
allowed for an exception that allows for application of the
exclusionary rule in instances of egregious Fourth Amendment
1. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 1013–14. I use the term “immigration hearing” rather than the more narrow
term “deportation hearing” because use of the exclusionary rule and the Ninth Circuit
standard apply to all immigration hearings and not only the subset of deportation hearings.
3. Id. at 1018–19.
4. While several judges voted to grant a rehearing en banc to review this standard, the
motion was denied. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009).
Due to the change in Attorney General, Holder’s name has replaced Mukasey’s on the order
denying rehearing. Id. at 1098.
5. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1018 (citing Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441,
1449 (9th Cir. 1994)).
6. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
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violations.7 The Ninth Circuit’s reasonableness standard is an
excessively broad interpretation of the “egregious” dicta from LopezMendoza.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Immigration officers visited the residence of Lopez-Rodriguez
on a tip that someone there was using a false birth certificate.8
Lopez-Rodriguez apparently answered the door, but left the officers
standing outside while she went to get her niece, Gastelum, whom
the officers suspected was using a false birth certificate with the name
Sugeyra.9 When the niece arrived, the door was slightly open.10 She
looked out at the officers, but did not open the door when they
asked for her name.11 While what happened next was disputed, the
immigration judge (“IJ”) found that the officers entered the house
without obtaining consent—by apparently pushing the door open
and walking inside.12 Once inside, the officers continued questioning
the niece who soon admitted that she was using a false birth
certificate.13 The officers arrested Gastelum, and they arrested LopezRodriguez under the suspicion that she was also in the country
illegally. While in custody, both admitted to being in the country
illegally.14
Lopez-Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress the evidence and
testimony obtained by the officers, claiming an egregious Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred. She claimed her niece’s initial
admission was given during an egregiously unconstitutional search of
her residence; consequently, she argued the arrests were unlawful
and statements made while in custody should be suppressed because
the exclusionary rule may apply in civil immigration hearings if an
egregious Fourth Amendment violation occurred.15 The IJ found
7. Id.
8. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1013–14.
9. See id. at 1014.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1014–15.
12. Id. at 1015. These facts are not totally clear, as the officers claimed consent was
given. However, because the IJ found no consent, the Ninth Circuit only provided LopezRodriguez’s version of the facts.
13. Id. at 1014.
14. See id.
15. I am assuming this was the argument made as the IJ decision is not published. I use
the term “egregious” in referring to Lopez-Rodriguez’s arguments in part to lay out the
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“‘some Fourth Amendment problems with the manner of entering
and questioning,’” but held that the Fourth Amendment violation
was not sufficiently “egregious” to allow suppression.16 Both LopezRodriguez and Gastelum were ordered to be deported,17 and on a
subsequent appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
the IJ’s decision was upheld.18
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, in a
five to four decision.19 This landmark case held that the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable in immigration hearings.20 This section is divided
into three parts. First, it provides a summary of Lopez-Mendoza and
how it opened the door for exceptions to its holding. Second, it
addresses the narrow exceptions the First and Second Circuits have
established regarding using the exclusionary rule in immigration
hearings. Third, it describes the development of the reasonableness
standard in the Ninth Circuit—which has opened the door to broad
exceptions to Lopez-Mendoza.
A. Lopez-Mendoza: Barring Application of the Exclusionary Rule in
Immigration Hearings
The issue before the Court in Lopez-Mendoza was whether an
admission of being in the country illegally should be suppressed in an
immigration hearing when the admission was obtained following an
unlawful arrest.21
In Lopez-Mendoza, immigration officers obtained permission
from the personnel manager of a potato plant in Washington to
check for illegal aliens. Sandoval-Sanchez, a defendant in the case,
general law that governs the issue.
16. Id. at 1015.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1014.
19. 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
20. Id. at 1050. The specific facts of the case dealt with immigration hearings, which are
civil hearings. The Court’s holding was broad, however, and included all civil hearings. Id. at
1038.
21. Id. at 1034. Lopez-Mendoza was a consolidation of two Ninth Circuit cases, but the
Court dismissed Lopez-Mendoza’s case on a technicality. Id. at 1039–40. Interestingly,
Lopez-Mendoza’s case involved a much more egregious Fourth Amendment violation than the
other case, where an auto shop owner had refused to allow INS agents to enter his shop, and
one agent entered while the other was distracting the owner. Id. at 1035–36.
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was arrested as a result of this workplace raid.22 After his arrest,
Sandoval-Sanchez admitted that he unlawfully entered the United
States.23 He later argued that his admission should be suppressed in
his immigration hearing because he had been illegally arrested.24 The
IJ held that the arrest was legal, but in the alternative, even if it was
illegal, that the legality of the arrest had no bearing on evidence in a
deportation hearing.25 The BIA dismissed Sandoval-Sanchez’s
appeal, concluding “that the circumstances of the arrest had not
affected the voluntariness of his recorded admission.”26
The Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc and reversed the BIA’s
decision.27 The court determined that Sandoval-Sanchez had been
unlawfully arrested and that the exclusionary rule barred his
subsequent admission.28 The court applied a cost-benefit test from
United States v. Janis29 and held that the marginal costs of imposing
the exclusionary rule in immigration hearings were “far
outweigh[ed]” by the benefits of deterring wrongful acts by INS
agents.30 It also held that alternatives to the exclusionary rule
proposed by the BIA were insufficient protections in comparison to
the exclusionary rule.31
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit.32 The Court held that the exclusionary rule does not
automatically apply in civil deportation hearings because they are
22. Id. at 1036–37. The officers did not have a search or an arrest warrant. LopezMendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1983).
23. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037.
24. Id. Specifically, his attorney argued that the arrest was unlawful because it was
obtained without a warrant, the methods used were unlawful, and Sandoval-Sanchez had never
been informed of his right to remain silent. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1060 n.1. During the
raid, the agents stood at an entrance to the factory and questioned, in English, anyone who
appeared nervous. If a worker could not respond in English, he was asked more detailed
questions in Spanish and was arrested if he admitted to being in the United States illegally or if
the agents suspected such was the case. The officers did not specifically remember SandovalSanchez’s suspicious activities as they arrested thirty-seven plant employees that day. Upon
further questioning at the county jail, he admitted to entering the United States illegally.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1036–37.
25. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1037.
26. Id. at 1038.
27. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1060–61.
28. Id. at 1061.
29. 428 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1976).
30. Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1073.
31. Id.
32. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051.

54

DO NOT DELETE

51

3/6/2010 2:16 PM

Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the Exclusionary Rule

aimed at stopping a “continuing violation of the immigration laws”
rather than punishing past transgressions, which is the aim of
criminal prosecutions.33 It based its holding on cost-benefit
analysis.34
Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority and reasoned that the
exclusionary rule’s effectiveness in deterring wrongful acts by
immigration officers is minimal for two reasons. First, the
exclusionary rule does not allow the identity of a person to be
suppressed; therefore, deportation would likely be ordered even if
the rule were applied because the INS only has to prove identity and
lack of documentation.35 Second, immigration officers are aware that
very few respondents ever challenge their arrest.36 O’Connor
concluded that internal INS regulations and the possibility of a
declaratory judgment against agency wrongful actions are more likely
to positively affect officer actions than the exclusionary rule.37
The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding the costs
of applying the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, calling
social costs in deportation proceedings both “unusual and
significant.”38 These high costs included allowing the commission of
an ongoing crime39 and hampering the INS’s efficient hearing
process.40 Specifically regarding workplace raids, Justice O’Connor
stated that Fourth Amendment claims, if permitted, would preclude
the practice because officers would be forced to create a more
complete record of each arrest.41

33. Id. at 1039.
34. Id. at 1041 (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at 446).
35. Id. at 1043.
36. Id. at 1044.
37. Id. at 1043–45. O’Connor placed emphasis on the internal INS regulations, in the
form of rules, training, and disciplinary actions, which were designed to prevent Fourth
Amendment violations. Id. at 1044–45.
38. Id. at 1046.
39. Id. at 1046–47. The Court applied the rule via analogy as it previously had been
applied to instances where the exclusionary rule barred prosecution of a crime, but did not
mandate that seized objects that are illegal to possess be returned. Id. (citing United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1991); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948)).
40. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048. O’Connor pointed out that an immigration
judge typically holds multiple hearings per day and that neither the agency nor the immigrant’s
attorney are likely to be well versed in Fourth Amendment law in order to quickly deal with
the Fourth Amendment issues. Id.
41. Id. at 1049–50.
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The Court held that these two high costs of condoning an
ongoing illegal act and thwarting efficient administration outweigh
the low benefit that the exclusionary rule provides in deterring
Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the exclusionary rule should
not apply in civil proceedings.42
However, Part V of the Lopez-Mendoza decision—consisting of
one paragraph—stated that the Court did not address “egregious
violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might
transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained.”43 This single sentence has
given rise to a circuit split regarding what constitutes such an
egregious violation.44
Part V, which is the last section in the decision and comes after
all of the Court’s reasoning and holding, is clearly dicta.
Furthermore, one Justice, of the five-Justice majority, did not join in
this section45—thus, as a plurality section, it does not carry the force
of law.
B. The Circuit Split: Standards Developed by the First and Second
Circuits Regarding Egregious Violations
The First Circuit requires that an immigrant show a Fourth
Amendment violation in the form of a clear “threat[], coercion, or
physical abuse” to qualify for the egregious exception.46 In
Kandamar v. Gonzales, an immigrant challenged numerous aspects
of a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) interview that
resulted in deportation proceedings.47 The First Circuit stated that
Lopez-Mendoza generally bars suppression in immigration hearings,
but the Supreme Court left “a glimmer of hope” that evidence may
be suppressed in cases of egregious Fourth Amendment violations.48
In further defining an egregious violation, the court reasoned that

42. See id. at 1050–51.
43. Id.
44. Part V also states that the decision does not address widespread abuses by
immigration officials. Id. However, this Note does not examine this possible exception because
my research did not turn up any published cases where an immigrant sought this exception.
45. Id. at 1034.
46. Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006).
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id. at 70 (quoting Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir.
2004)).
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there was no evidence of “threats, coercion or physical abuse . . . that
would constitute egregious government conduct” and there was no
evidence of a forced retention in the DHS interview.49 The First
Circuit has thus established a high bar for application of the
egregious exception.
The Second Circuit’s rule likely falls somewhere in between the
narrow First Circuit exception and the broad Ninth Circuit
exception.50 In Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, a border patrol officer
asked Almeida-Amaral to stop and provide identification as AlmeidaAmaral entered a gas station.51 Almeida-Amaral gave the officer a
Brazilian passport and was immediately arrested.52 The IJ denied the
immigrant’s motion to suppress based on a suspicionless stop and
the BIA sustained the decision.53
The Second Circuit established a rule allowing application of the
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings if “the [Fourth
Amendment] violation—regardless of its egregiousness or
unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”54
Thus, the Second Circuit rule is not based on the egregious
exception, but seems to be derived from the Court’s policy of not
suppressing evidence in immigration hearings that is credible.55 The
court held that a suspicionless stop, by itself, was not enough to be
egregious, and some additional offending conduct must have
occurred.56 In dicta, the court also stated the bright-line rule, based
on Ninth Circuit precedent, that a race-based stop would be an
egregious violation.57 Even though the court relied heavily on Ninth
Circuit precedent, it adopted a narrow, race-based exception rather
than the Ninth Circuit’s broad reasonableness exception.

49. Id. at 71–72.
50. See infra Part III.C.
51. 461 F.3d 231, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2006).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 233.
54. Id. at 235.
55. Interestingly, this policy was relied upon by the IJ and BIA in Lopez-Mendoza, but
did not play an important role in the Supreme Court’s decision in that case. See supra notes
25–26 and accompanying text.
56. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235–36.
57. Id. Specifically, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit case Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS,
22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). For further discussion of Gonzalez-Rivera, see infra notes 58–
66 and accompanying text.
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C. The Unreasonable Standard in the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has developed a broader exception to LopezMendoza than the First and Second Circuits. This exception, which
in essence asks whether the actions by peace or immigration officers
were unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment, all but
swallows the rule of barring the exclusionary rule in immigration
proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the unreasonable standard in
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS.58 In this case, an immigration officer
claimed he pulled Gonzalez-Rivera over because he “fail[ed] to look
at the Border Patrol car; . . . appeared to have a ‘dry’ mouth; . . . was
blinking; . . . and [had a] Hispanic appearance.”59 The IJ suppressed
the documents found in the car, holding that the immigration officer
stopped Gonzalez-Rivera solely based on race and that such a stop
was an egregious Fourth Amendment violation.60 The BIA reversed,
stating that race was not the sole factor.61 The Ninth Circuit reversed
the BIA, concluding that the IJ was correct in deciding that the
officer had pulled Gonzalez-Rivera over solely based on his race.62
Rather than merely holding, as the IJ did, that a race-based stop
is sufficiently egregious for the exclusionary rule to apply,63 the
Ninth Circuit used reasoning from a previous case regarding a civil
IRS hearing and established a much broader rule—that any bad faith
constitutional violation is egregious.64 The court then defined a bad

58. 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760 F.2d 907
(9th Cir. 1985) (amended). The first Ninth Circuit case that addressed the issue, BenitezMendez, is not discussed because later cases have ignored that early decision. In that case, an
immigration officer detained an immigrant in the officer’s car while the officer searched the
immigrant’s vehicle. Id. at 908–09. The court simply held that the exclusionary rule no longer
applied in civil deportation proceedings. Id. at 909–10.
59. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1446.
60. Id. at 1442.
61. Id. at 1442–43.
62. Id. at 1446–48.
63. This was the rule the Second Circuit adopted based on this case. See Almeida-Amaral
v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2006).
64. In a novel bit of legal footwork, the court sidestepped the fact that the egregious
dicta from Lopez-Mendoza was not joined by a majority of the Court by arguing that the
dissenting Justices surely “would have approved” of weakening the bright-line rule by allowing
for an egregious exception. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1448 n.2. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has
concluded that “to the extent such head-counting is a helpful way of reading Supreme Court
opinions, there were eight votes on the Lopez-Mendoza Court for at least leaving open the
possibility that the exclusionary rule might apply to egregious violations.” Orhorhaghe v. INS,
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faith violation as one where evidence is obtained “by deliberate
violations of the fourth amendment, or by conduct a reasonable
officer should have known is a violation of the Constitution.”65 The
court then attempted to narrow this broad rule:
In applying an objective standard of “bad faith” . . . we emphasize
that in the present case we only determine what constitutes a bad
faith stop based solely on race . . . and do not purport to be setting
forth the standard for determining what constitutes a bad faith
constitutional violation in other contexts.66

This limiting language, however, failed to deter litigants from
seeking additional “unreasonable” exceptions—as Lopez-Rodriguez
demonstrates.
Merely holding that a race-based stop is an egregious Fourth
Amendment violation, and thus is an exception to the LopezMendoza rule, would have kept the Ninth Circuit more closely in line
with the precedent set by Lopez-Mendoza, which possibly allowed for
narrow exceptions to be developed as the First and Second Circuits
have done. However, the Ninth Circuit chose to use a broad
reasonableness standard, which in turn has invited additional
litigation as other defendants seek to suppress evidence in
immigration hearings.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LOPEZ-RODRIGUEZ V.
MUKASEY
In Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey,67 the Ninth Circuit added a new
egregious exception: Any unconstitutional search of a residence is
unreasonable and, therefore, evidence that is a fruit of the search
must be suppressed under the egregious exception. In an interesting
commentary, the court quoted an earlier decision stating that the
egregious language from Lopez-Mendoza was a “suggestion” to
create such exceptions.68
38 F.3d 488, 493 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1448 n.2). While
logical, this argument ignores the fact that a dissenting Justice could have joined section five
and given it the power of law. No Justice chose to do so, and the dicta supported by four
Justices should not have been heavily relied on as law.
65. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1449 (quoting Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d 541,
545 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008).
68. Id. at 1016 (quoting Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 493).
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In establishing its rule in Lopez-Rodriguez, the court first stated
the Circuit’s established rule that a reasonableness standard is used to
determine whether the egregious exception from Lopez-Mendoza
should apply.69 It then quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in
Payton v. New York70 to establish that “[i]t is a basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”71 Thus, the
court concluded that any information attained as a result of the
nonconsensual entry in this case would be suppressed in a criminal
case.72 It then reasoned that since warrantless and nonconsensual
entries are prohibited, any such entry would be unreasonable and
“[t]hus, the INS agents’ Fourth Amendment violation was
‘egregious’ under [the] Circuit’s controlling interpretation of the
term.”73
Judge Bybee wrote a concurring opinion. He argued that the
ruling was in conformity with the current rule of the Ninth Circuit,
but raised the concern that the circuit’s rule contradicts LopezMendoza. He argued the exception was broader than intended and
threatened to “swallow up the rule.”74 Judge Bybee also noted the
potential circuit split between the broad Ninth Circuit rule and the
more narrow rules of other circuits.75
The government moved for a rehearing en banc, but in March of
2009, the motion was denied.76 In a dissent to the denial, authored
by Judge Bea and joined by four other judges, Bea argued that the
current Ninth Circuit rule clearly contradicts Lopez-Mendoza because
the reasonableness standard is equivalent to a qualified immunity
standard77—and qualified immunity is applicable in non-egregious
69. Id.; see supra Part III.C.
70. 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers
from entering a residence to make an arrest without a warrant or consent).
71. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980)).
72. Id. at 1018.
73. Id. at 1019 (citing Adamson v. Comm’r, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)).
74. Id. at 1019–20 (Bybee, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1020–21; see supra Part III.B.
76. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (Holder’s name
was substituted for Mukasey’s).
77. Pursuant to qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary
functions are immune from liability as long as their conduct does not “violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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situations.78 Bea further criticized the standard because it relies on
officer knowledge.79 He prefers the First and Second Circuit
egregious standards that focus on officer conduct, not knowledge.80
V. ANALYSIS
Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey widens the circuit split over the
egregious exception; consequently, the Supreme Court can be
reasonably expected to take up this matter at some point in the
future. This section provides three reasons why the Supreme Court
should eliminate the egregious exception—especially the Ninth
Circuit’s version of the rule. First, the circuits that accept an
egregious exception ignore the cost-benefit test and the Court’s
reasoning in Lopez-Mendoza. Second, there is a perverse incentive in
using the exclusionary rule for ongoing crimes. And third, the Court
has taken steps to diminish the importance of the exclusionary rule
since Lopez-Mendoza.
Each of these three reasons is premised on the fact that the
current Ninth Circuit rule encourages the type of time-consuming
analysis by immigration judges that the Lopez-Mendoza majority
sought to avoid.81 In using cost-benefit analysis, the Lopez-Mendoza
court did not condone unconstitutional actions by immigration
officials; it merely concluded it would be cost prohibitive to use
immigration hearings and case-by-case analysis of Fourth
Amendment violations, to remedy such actions.82
The Ninth Circuit has ignored this reasoning by establishing
multiple exceptions to the general rule that evidence should not be
suppressed in immigration hearings.83 Furthermore, Lopez-Rodriguez
established an entirely new exception. Establishing the
“nonconsensual entry of a residence exception” advocated in Lopez-

78.
(2001)).
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1101 n.7 (Bea, J., dissenting) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202
Id. at 1104–05.
Id. at 1105–06.
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1984).
Id. at 1050.
See supra Part III.C.
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Rodriguez will surely encourage future respondents in immigration
hearings to file suppression motions seeking additional exceptions.84
A. The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits Ignore the Janis Cost-Benefit
Test and the Court’s Reasoning in Lopez-Mendoza
The bulk of the Supreme Court’s Lopez-Mendoza decision
applied the Janis cost-benefit test to determine whether the
exclusionary rule is appropriate in immigration hearings. The First,
Second, and Ninth Circuits fail to apply the Janis test in their cases
dealing with an egregious exception to the Lopez-Mendoza rule.85 As
this was the basis of the decision in Lopez-Mendoza, the lower courts
should use the Janis cost-benefit test to determine whether
exceptions to Lopez-Mendoza should be created. Such analysis would
allow for more predictability than the broad, current Ninth Circuit
rule. If an egregious violation has occurred, then the benefit of
excluding evidence from the violation increases due to a desire to
prevent such extreme misconduct by immigration agents. Courts
should show how the extreme misbehavior would tip the costbenefit scale and lead to the opposite conclusion the Court reached
in Lopez-Mendoza.
A probable reason the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the Janis test
in its case law addressing the egregious exception is that it would be
extremely difficult to apply the test and reach a different conclusion
than the Court did in Lopez-Mendoza without contradicting Justice
O’Connor’s reasoning in that case.86 Still, while it would have been
difficult, it would not have been impossible if the Ninth Circuit had
focused on differentiating the facts of Lopez-Mendoza—which only
encompassed workplace raids—to Gonzalez-Rivera where a specific
automobile passenger had been pulled over and targeted. If the
Ninth Circuit had applied the test required from Lopez-Mendoza it
84. The court could have sought to discourage this with language in Lopez-Rodriguez
that would discourage respondents in immigration hearings from seeking additional
exceptions. However, no such language was used.
85. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Ninth Circuit quoted the egregious language from Lopez-Mendoza, but limited its
discussion to the rest of Lopez-Mendoza to the statement: “In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not generally apply in
deportation proceedings, where the sole issues are identity and alienage.” Id. (citing LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034). The Ninth Circuit never mentioned the Janis test or cost-benefit
analysis.
86. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045–46.
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would not have developed such an open-ended rule requiring the
time consuming case-by-case analysis the majority sought to avoid in
Lopez-Mendoza.
B. The Perverse Incentive of Encouraging Lawbreaking by Immigrants
in Order to Discourage Officer Misconduct
Having a broad rule that allows immigrants to seek use of the
exclusionary rule, such as the Ninth Circuit’s rule, encourages the
filing of frivolous claims. In all likelihood, Justice White, in his LopezMendoza dissent, was correct in stating that immigrants will be more
likely to utilize the exclusionary rule than subsequent § 1983 civil
actions.87 However, he failed to point out the reason this is the
case—an immigrant’s desire to remain in the country as long as
possible. Those illegally present often have a strong incentive to
remain in the country due to personal and family ties to their
community and for employment reasons. If they can raise a routine
argument in an immigration hearing that may require discovery or
prolong an IJ’s decision-making process, then it can only be
expected that the argument will be raised, whether valid or not given
the facts of the situation.88
While it could be argued that the same incentive regarding
ongoing crimes is applicable in some criminal contexts and the
exclusionary rule is still permitted, this argument fails because of the
differences between criminal prosecution and civil hearings like
immigration hearings. If evidence is suppressed in a criminal context,
it can never be used against the accused because once the
proceedings end, the matter cannot be retried due to the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution.89 However, this rule does not
apply in immigration hearings.90 In an immigration hearing, the
exact same evidence could be re-gathered immediately after the
87. Id. at 1055 (White, J., dissenting).
88. This reasoning admittedly assumes that some attorneys would ignore the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct that expressly forbid the filing of motions merely to
delay resolution of the issue before the tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2
(stating that a client does not have a valid interest in delaying resolution of an action); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (allowing sanctioning of an attorney if a motion is filed with a court
for the “improper purpose” of “caus[ing] unnecessary delay”).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90. Cf. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (“And since there is no
double-jeopardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may
be awarded against petitioners for the same publication.”).
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immigration judge suppresses the evidence. For example,
immigration agents could simply follow the immigrant out of the
building, and as long as they could show reasonable suspicion, they
could request documentation and seek a confession.91 The
immigrant could then be brought back before the immigration judge
based on the exact same claim as before—that her presence was
illegal. The fact that immigration officials can bring the same claim in
a subsequent action lessens any potential impact of the exclusionary
rule.
No judicial system should encourage law breaking. A criminal,
once caught, will be reluctant to re-commit the same crime because
of the fear of being caught again. There is no such incentive for an
immigrant that is not deported due to officer misconduct; instead,
the immigrant will simply continue to remain in the country
illegally.92
C. The Supreme Court Does Not Favor Use of the Exclusionary Rule
Over Other Remedies, but This Is Precisely What the Ninth Circuit
Rule Does
It is unlikely that the current Supreme Court will uphold cases
that expand the exclusionary rule. The Court illustrated its lack of
enthusiasm when it comes to the exclusionary rule last session in
Herring v. United States by stating: “The exclusion of evidence ‘has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.’”93 Much has been
written on the exclusionary rule, and this Note does not explore the
issue in depth. Suffice it to say that since the publication of Dallin
Oaks’s oft-cited article on the subject in 1970,94 the Court has
91. In this hypothetical situation the officers conduct a mere stop. If they could show
they had probable cause before or after the stop, they could re-arrest the immigrant and
demand documentation.
92. I recognize that criminals who “get off” may be emboldened and commit similar
crimes again. Even if this is the case, there is no indication of this at the time of dismissal, and
the public can hope that such crimes will not be committed. However, in the case of an
undocumented immigrant, after being arrested and before appearing before an IJ, the
immigrant has already turned down voluntary departure. It is extremely unlikely that the
immigrant will later choose to depart voluntarily after being released from custody.
93. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009)).
94. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665 (1970) (providing an extensive analysis of the effect of the exclusionary rule on law
enforcement and arguing that the rule be abolished and replaced with civil remedies); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.

64

DO NOT DELETE

51

3/6/2010 2:16 PM

Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the Exclusionary Rule

repeatedly chosen not to increase the use or importance of the
exclusionary rule. However, in many instances, like Herring, it has
limited the rule.95
The strongest argument in support of granting the rehearing en
banc in Lopez-Rodriguez was the fact that it expanded the use of the
exclusionary rule. As Judge Bybee alluded to in his Lopez-Rodriguez
concurrence, if the Supreme Court were to take up the issue it would
almost surely strike down the Ninth Circuit rule.96 As the rule stands,
it defines a broad exception to the Court’s holding in LopezMendoza, and invites further expansion of the exception, which will
also expand the use of the exclusionary rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Lopez-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit expanded and further
entrenched a rule that fails to follow the Supreme Court’s precedent
in Lopez-Mendoza. In determining whether the egregious exception
should apply, thus allowing the suppression of evidence in an
immigration hearing, the court relied on the Circuit’s reasonable
officer conduct standard. The court then used Supreme Court
precedent to show that nonconsensual entry of a residence by a
peace officer is unreasonable. Combining these two rules, the court
held that the immigration officers’ entry in Lopez-Rodriguez was
unreasonable, and therefore, an egregious Fourth Amendment
violation.
The Ninth Circuit wrongly concluded that the egregious
exception, which is dicta from a plurality section of the Supreme
Court’s Lopez-Mendoza opinion, is a valid basis for developing broad
case law and establishing numerous exceptions to Lopez-Mendoza.
Furthermore, Lopez-Rodriguez widens the circuit split on this issue
and will hinder immigration enforcement by allowing routine
motions seeking suppression due to Fourth Amendment violations.
This is exactly what Lopez-Mendoza sought to prevent.
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split not by merely
adopting one circuit’s interpretation of the Lopez-Mendoza
1365 (2008) (“Oaks’s article is the second most cited of those published by The University of
Chicago Law Review in its seventy-five year history . . . .”).
95. Lopez-Mendoza is an excellent example of this as the holding barred the exclusionary
rule from immigration hearings. 468 U.S. at 1050.
96. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bybee, J.,
concurring).
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exception, but by abandoning the egregious exception altogether.
The three key reasons the Court should abandon the egregious
exception are (1) any use of the exception should have been based
on cost-benefit analysis, which no circuit has done, (2) a perverse
incentive underlies using the exclusionary rule for ongoing crimes,
and (3) the Court has continually weakened the exclusionary rule
while a broad egregious exception strengthens the rule.
Eric W. Clarke
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